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In connection with the special meeting conducted by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) in March 1996, two legal studies have been circulated: The
Right to Control Passage of Nuclear Transport Vessels Under International Law,
by Duncan E.J. Currie on behalf of Greenspeace International;' and Applying
the Precautionary Principle to Ocean Shipments of Radioactive Materials by Jon
M. Van Dyke for the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI).2 Because of the importance
of the issues addressed at that meeting, these studies warrant careful attention.
This article identifies the key assertions in the Van Dyke paper in particular,
and examines them in light of prevailing doctrines of international law. Professor
Van Dyke's paper proceeds from the flawed premise that a "precautionary princi-
ple" has become a part of customary international law. The inferences he draws
from that mistaken premise are, in varying degrees and for various reasons, also
mistaken.
I. Background
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) promulgates basic interna-
tional regulations for the transportation of radioactive materials. 3 In 1993, IAEA's
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1. Duncan E.J. Currie, The Right to Control Passage of Nuclear Transport Vessels Under
International Law (Apr. 7, 1995). Mr Currie is employed by the Greenpeace International Legal
Department.
2. Jon M. Van Dyke, Applying the Precautionary Principle to Ocean Shipments of Radioactive
Materials, 27 OCEAN & INT'L L. 379 (1996). Professor Van Dyke teaches at the University of Hawaii
School of Law.
3. See BARBARA KWIATKOWSKA & ALFRED H.A. SOONS, Introduction to TRANSBOUNDARY
MOVEMENTS AND DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BASIc DOCUMENTS
at xxvii-xxviii (Barbara Kwiatkowska & Alfred H.A. Soons eds., 1993).
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regulations 4 were supplemented by the IMO Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradi-
ated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Waste in Flasks On-
Board Ships.
5
In 1992 and 1995, prompted in part by efforts of the environmental organization
Greenpeace International (GI), sea shipments of plutonium and radioactive waste
between France and Japan drew public attention. A number of enroute states
objected to these shipments, and the 1995 conference concerning extension of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) noted these objections.
In March 1996, the IMO Secretary-General, William A. O'Neill, convened
a three-day Special Consultative Meeting (SCM) in London on the carriage of
nuclear materials by sea. A number of the thirty-two states that participated in
the meeting submitted position papers. Ireland, for example, argued that "coastal
states should be notified in advance of the passage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel
(INF) cargoes past their coastlines." 6 Similarly, Solomon Islands asserted that
"[c]oastal states along the route of a ship are entitled to be advised and consulted
about the voyage in advance," 7 and "must have an input in the course of voyage
planning, in the context of safe routing, enroute facilities and routine and emer-
gency support available in their territories." 8 Solomon Islands' presentation ex-
pressly sought application of the "precautionary approach." 9 Speaking for itself
and a number of other countries,' ° Argentina urged adoption of "a full code"
and "a binding instrument" to achieve improvements in the present arrangements.
Argentina presented a document which sought criteria to ensure that any ship
transporting INF materials would only enter the jurisdictional or territorial waters
of a third State-in exercise of freedom of navigation, innocent or transit passage,
as recognized by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS)-when no high-seas route of similar convenience with respect to
navigational and hydrographical characteristics existed. The criteria suggested
by Argentina would also ensure that "the ships entering the jurisdictional or
territorial waters of another State comply with the routing systems set up by such
States in the maritime spaces subject to their jurisdiction-assuming that such
systems do no[t] annul free navigation or innocent or transmit passage ....
4. General Conference Resolution on Code of Practice on the International Transboundary
Movement of Radioactive Waste, IAEA (Sept. 21, 1990), 30 I.L.M. 556 (1991).
5. IMO Assembly Res. A.748(18) (Nov. 4, 1993), discussed in Barbara Kwiatkowska & Alfred
H.A. Soons, Comment, Plutonium Shipments-A Supplement, 25 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 419, 424
(1994). The INF Code is a voluntary Code of Practice rather than a legally binding set of regulations.
6. Statement of Ireland 3 4.
7. Statement of Solomon Islands 2 9.
8. Id. at 3 10.
9. Id. 14.
10. Australia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Spain, Indonesia, Ireland, Solomon Islands, Mex-
ico, New Zealand, and Venezuela.
11. Argentina, Towards an Adequate Regulation of the Maritime Transport of Irradiated Nuclear
Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes 4-5 2.
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South Africa, in its statement, recognized the right of INF Code ships to have
innocent passage through its territorial waters. However, South Africa stressed
the desirability of timely notice of ship movements in order for regulatory authori-
ties to perform their functions and reassure the public. 2
No definitive position emerged from the IMO meeting, although Chairman
G.A. Dubbeld (Netherlands) identified a variety of safety and legal issues that
demand further consideration within IMO's committee structure. Particularly
relevant to the present study is the fact that "the possibility of excluding ships
carrying INF from particularly sensitive sea areas"' 3 is being considered (along
with route planning) by IMO's Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation, which
met in July 1996. IMO's Marine Environment Protection and Legal Committees
(MEPC) may also consider this matter "since it raises various issues concerning
the freedom of navigation and rights under" UNCLOS.14
II. The Precautionary Principle
Professor Van Dyke asserts that customary international law today includes
a precautionary principle, one element of which creates a right on the part of
states, through whose exclusive economic zones (EEZs) spent nuclear fuel (SNF)
or plutonium is shipped, to be notified in advance of the transit. He also maintains
that such states may veto voyages of this kind. These assertions do not withstand
scrutiny.
Serious difficulties arise with Professor Van Dyke's thesis. First and most
important, his position that the precautionary principle has become part of custom-
ary international law, and as such must be followed, is doubtful. Plainly, custom-
ary international law is one type of binding international legal norm, along with
treaties and conventions. But, to be an accepted part of customary international
law, more is required than a pastiche of materials, most of which fall far short
of treaty status.
Intimations of a precautionary approach or precautionary principle have been
discerned in various "nonbinding statements, declarations, guidelines, action
programs and principles developed by private international organizations.""'
However, reliance on these developments involves what Professor Naomi Roht-
Arriaza of the University of California's Hastings College of the Law has de-
12. Report by the Republic of South Africa's Representative to Special Consultative Meeting
of Entities Involved in the Maritime Transport of Nuclear Material Subject to the INF Code at 3
115.
13. Three-Day Meeting on Nuclear Materials Ends, IMO File Ref. A4/A/102 (Mar. 7, 1996).
14. Id. at 2.
15. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Book Review, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 183, 187 (1996) (reviewing
HARALD HOHMANN, PRECAUTIONARY LEGAL DUTIES AND PRINCIPLES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
BETWEEN EXPLOITATION AND PROTECTION (1994) and BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW (1994)).
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scribed as a "novel" methodological approach which "flies in the face of much
traditional doctrine about the sources of international law." 1
6
Setting aside the sufficiency vel non of its sources, conscious international
recognition of a precautionary principle is of recent vintage. Indeed, the precau-
tionary principle has been said to date only to 1987. According to Professor
Freestone and Dr. Hey, "[t]he first explicit formulation of the precautionary
concept at the international level was contained in the Declaration of the Second
International North Sea Conference on the Protection of the North Sea (London
Declaration).' ' 7 The London Declaration occurred in late 1987, only ten years
ago. The same authors point to a reference to a precautionary concept in the
earlier Bremen Declaration, apparently suggesting some slippage on this point
between the English and German texts, 8 but even so, that would hardly suggest
that recognition of a precautionary principle has existed for a substantial period
of time. After all, that Declaration was issued in late 1984, thirteen years ago.
Another author comments that "[slince 1982-1987, modern international environ-
mental law has been largely characterized by precautionary legal duties and princi-
ples."' 9 Professor Dan Bodansky of the University of Washington School of Law
has suggested that the precautionary principle lay behind the commercial whaling
moratorium proposals of the 1970s. 20 Also, Philippe Sands (who does not squarely
claim that the principle has become part of international law)2' argues that the
"traditional approach to the burden of proof began to shift as early as 1969,"
citing the Oil Pollution Intervention Convention of that year.22
Regardless of the diverse starting points selected, and even allowing for the
general acceleration in the tempo of international relations in the late twentieth
16. Id. at 189.
17. David Freestone & Ellen Hey, Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle, in
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION
5 & n.15 (David Freestone & Ellen Hey eds., 1996); see also James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R.
Walker, Refining the Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law, 14 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 423 (1995).
18. Freestone & Hey, supra note 17.
19. HOHMANN, supra note 15, at 343.
20. New Developments in International Environmental Law, 85 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 401,
414 (1991).
21. Philippe Sands, The "Greening" of International Law: Emerging Principles and Rules, 1
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 293, 300-02 (1994) (principle "has ... received widespread support
by the international community," its status "as a governing rule of international law has been
challenged as questionable," "[a]t a minimum ... there is sufficient evidence of state practice to
justify the conclusion that the principle, as elaborated in the Rio Declaration, reflects a broadly
accepted basis for international action, even if the consequence of its application in a given situation
remains open to interpretation"). Id. at 300-302.
22. Id. at 298 & n. 17 (citing International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas
in Cases of Oil Pollution Damage), Nov. 29, 1969, arts. I, V(3)(a), 9 International Legal Materials
(I.L.M.) 25, 29 (entered into force, May 6, 1975)).
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century23 and the fact that persistence over a long period of time is no longer
required for a principle of customary international law to take root, a a principle
must be "relatively extensive and uniform" and "state practice must be consistent
with the existence of the obligation in order for the principle to become part of
customary international law.'- 25 The precautionary principle does not meet these
requirements since, although it has been extensively referred to, the references
are far from uniform.26 Nor, in the specific context addressed by Professor Van
Dyke, can it be said that there exists the required wealth of consistent state
practice based on state reaction to a small number of voyages. This is particularly
noteworthy since, despite the fact that UNCLOS provisions "confer upon coastal
states the ability to adopt a variety of measures for the marine environment's
protection notwithstanding the recognition of various navigational rights such as
innocent or transit passage, .... some states persist in taking unilateral measures
that existing international law does not strictly support." 27 It is therefore difficult
to accept the notion that so sweeping a doctrine has, in this time and manner,
ripened into a binding norm of international law.
Authorities disagree as to whether the precautionary principle (which even its
proponents must admit has not been codified in international law) 8 has become
part of customary international law. Professor Freestone and Dr. Hey report that
"Ithe precautionary concept has become intrinsic to international environmental
policy, especially with the adoption, in 1992, of the Rio Declaration at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)." 2 9 They also
assert that "the precautionary concept found its way into international law and
23. "Compared with the past, the process of the formulation of customary [international] law
has accelerated considerably." HOHMANN, supra note 15, at 167.
24. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 15, at 189 & n.24 (citing, inter alia, North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) 3, 42-44
(Feb. 20).
25. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 15, at 189 & n.25 (citing North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra
note 24).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 38-43, 55.
27. Donald R. Rothwell, Navigational Rights and Freedoms in the Asia Pacific Following Entry
into Force of the Law of the Sea Convention, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 608-09 (1995) (footnotes
omitted) (citing, inter alia, "the request by a number of states, including Indonesia and the Philippines,
for the plutonium carrying Akatsuki Maru to remain outside of territorial waters." See id. at 609
& n.152).
28. Jennifer R. Kitt, Note, Waste Exports to the Developing World: A Global Response, 7 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 485, 502 (1995).
29. Freestone & Hey, supra note 17, at 3; see also Leigh Hancher, EC Environmental Policy-
A Precautionary Tale?, in Freestone & Hey, supra note 17, at 187 & n.3. Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration calls upon states to apply a "precautionary approach" to environmental protection. "The
negotiators rejected suggestions by some European countries to promote a Precautionary Principle."
Jeffrey D. Kovar, A Short Guide to the Rio Declaration, 4 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 119,
134 (1993).
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policy as a result of German proposals to the International North Sea Ministerial
Conference," 3 thus clearly implying that it is part of international law. 1
However, in an earlier article, Dr. Hey wrote guardedly on the question,
stating "while the precautionary concept may be on its way to becoming part
of customary international law, its precise content and implications remain un-
clear." 32 Professors Hickey and Walker have likewise observed that "[r]eferences
to precaution reveal a variable, vague, and often confusing 'principle' for states
to follow in preventing pollution. "
33
Numerous authors have expressed their views on whether the precautionary concept
has been accepted as customary international law. Based on these views, it is fair to
say that the concept has at least approached the status of a rule of customary international
law, and that the support expressed by states for documents containing the concept is
not without legal significance. However, the precise implications of this development
remain-to use the description so accurately chosen by Gundling-elusive.34
More recently, Professor Freestone and Dr. Hey have written that "[w]hether
it has entered the hallowed portals of customary international law is still a matter
of debate amongst international lawyers but for most intents and purposes that
debate is no longer of central importance. "3 This opinion improperly minimizes
the critical distinctions between state action taken because it is compelled by an
external, binding legal norm (or not taken despite the existence of such a norm),
on the one hand, and state action taken solely because it is "good public policy"
(or eschewed because it is not "good public policy"), on the other.
Two other authors, Mr. Cameron and Ms. Abouchar, have, in turn, com-
mented that "[a]lthough some would contend that the precautionary principle
has yet to be firmly established as a customary norm, a vast amount of
30. Freestone & Hey, supra note 17, at 4 & n. 13 (emphasis added). See also Ellen Hey, The
Precautionary Approach: Implications of the Revision of the Oslo and Paris Conventions, 15 MAINE
POL'Y 244-45 (July 1991).
31. See, e.g., Gregory D. Fullem, Comment, The Precautionary Principle: Environmental Pro-
tection in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 495 (1995). The student author
of this article comments:
Regardless of the naysayers, the precautionary principle is being incorporated into
environmental law and policy at an ever-escalating rate, and a cogent argument can
thus be made that the principle, in light of environmental and economic exigencies,
is becoming customary international law.
See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 15, at nn.24-25.
[D]espite its varied forms and amorphous definition, its prevalence justifies commenta-
tors' assertions.that the precautionary principle is emerging as a customary norm of
international law.
See id. at n. 17, text accompanying note 71.
32. Ellen Hey, The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing
Caution, 4 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 303, 307 (1992) (emphasis added).
33. Hickey & Walker, supra note 17, text accompanying note 12.
34. Hey, supra note 32, at 307 & nn.19-20 (emphasis added).
35. David Freestone & Ellen Hey, Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Challenges and
Opportunities, in Freestone & Hey, supra note 17, at 249 & n. 1.
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evidence stands contrary to that notion."-3 6 Yet another author states quite
simply: "Now that the precautionary principle has become accepted as an
international legal principle. . . .""
Professors Birnie and Boyle are among those questioning whether the precau-
tionary principle has become part of customary international law. In 1992, they
wrote that:
[d]espite its attractions, the great variety of interpretations given to the precautionary
principle, and the novel and far-reaching effects of some applications suggest that it
is not yet a principle of international law. Difficult questions concerning the point at
which it becomes applicable to any given activity remain unanswered and seriously
undermine its normative character and practical utility, although support for it does
indicate a policy of greater prudence on the part of those states willing to accept it.
38
Another expert questioning the status of the precautionary principle as a rule
of customary international law is Dr. Konrad van Moltke. In his view, the precau-
tionary principle, "like other principles of environmental management, is not a
legally binding mandate," 39 a formulation in which Professor Freestone and Dr.
Hey ultimately concur. 4°
The unresolved content of the precautionary principle has been remarked on
repeatedly. In 1995, Professors Hickey and Walker, who are certainly not un-
friendly to the concept, explained that
the articulations since 1987 have not refined the pollution prevention obligation into a
predictable substantive rule of precautionary obligation. Fundamental uncertainties still
must be addressed. First, it is unclear whether precaution is a recommendation, an
obligation, or some intermediate duty....
Second, the level of environmental risk that triggers precautionary measures remains
unsettled ...
Third, uncertainties exist regarding not only which sciences, factors, or scientific
determinations are relevant, but also the factual settings in which different levels of
scientific knowledge would apply ....
Professors Hickey and Walker are not alone in suggesting that there are large
holes in this doctrinal cheese. Professor Bodansky commented at the 1991 Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law that "[a]lthough the precau-
36. James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International
Law, in Freestone & Hey, supra note 17, at 36-37.
37. Andrd Nollkaemper, "What You Risk Reveals What You Value, "and Other Dilemmas En-
countered in the Legal Assaults on Risks, in Freestone & Hey, supra note 17, at 73 & n.3 (citing
six conventions from 1991-94).
38. Cameron & Abouchar, supra note 36, at 37 n.27 (quoting PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN
E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 98 (1992)).
39. Konrad von Moltke, The Relationship Between Policy, Science, Technology, Economics and
Law in the Implementation of the Precautionary Principle, in FREESTONE & HEY, supra note 17, at
106.
40. David Freestone & Ellen Hey, Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Challenges and
Opportunities, in Freestone & Hey, supra note 17, at 253.
41. Hickey & Walker, supra note 17, at 436 (see infra text accompanying notes 54-63) (footnotes
omitted).
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tionary principle is often espoused, its parameters and meaning are not altogether
clear."- 42 He further stated:
The precautionary principle provides a general orientation to environmental issues. In
my view, however, it is far too vague to serve as a regulatory standard. It either does
not address-or addresses only in the most general terms-two key questions: First,
what level of risk warrants precautionary action? And, second, what level of precaution
is warranted and at what price? Indeed, the answers to these questions given by different
formulations of the precautionary principle are so varied that it is difficult to speak of
a single precautionary principle at all.43
He repeatedly introduces his discussion with "even if we adopt the precautionary
principle,""4 and suggests "a cautious attitude" towards it (even though "we
may wish to adopt it as a general goal"), 45 thus clearly implying that, in his
view, that principle has not yet been adopted as a binding norm in customary
international law. For him, it is clear that, at best, "the jury is still out.'' 46
In a similar vein, writing on State Responsibility and the Precautionary Princi-
ple, Professor Catherine Tinker has observed:
The precautionary principle or the principle of precautionary action has appeared as
soft law in numerous conference declarations and other statements of what governments
think the law should be. It has also been included in several treaties. However, absent
strong evidence of state practice and opinio juris, such as an explicit statement from
a high-level government minister that precautionary measures were adopted because they
are mandated under international law, it is difficult to conclude that the precautionary
principle is or is not customary law. Rather the question is the effect on the international
law of state responsibility and liability of the precautionary principle if it is or becomes
law, either through treaty obligations or through the development of customary interna-
tional law.47
42. New Developments in International Environmental Law, supra note 20, at 414. He was
previously with the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. Id. at 401. See also
M.P.A. Kendall, UNCED and the Evolution of Principles of International Environmental Law, 25
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 19, 23-25 (1991) (noting debate over formulation of the principle); Christopher
D. Stone, Deciphering "Sustainable Development," 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 982 (1994) ("there
is no 'the' precautionary principle, but text-books [sic] full of precautionary principles, plural").
A student author has noted that the Bamako Convention "is a particularly novel use of the precautionary
principle" since it "requires preventative measures even without scientific proof of harm," whereas
the precautionary principle "normally advocates action by states when scientific proof is unclear,
not when it is nonexistent." Kitt, supra note 28, at 502.
43. New Developments in International Environmental Law, supra note 20, at 415-16; see also
Hickey & Walker, supra note 17.
44. New Developments in International Environmental Law, supra note 20, at 416-17.
45. Id. at 417.
46. Inexplicably, Professor Van Dyke's paper implies (at n. 11) that Mr. Bodansky is among
those who hold that the precautionary principle is already a norm of customary international law.
47. Freestone & Hey, supra note 17, at 53 & n. 1 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). In the
omitted footnote, Professor Tinker cites only one source as asserting that the precautionary principle
is recognized as binding international law, HOHMANN, supra note 15, at 343 & n.42, and two that
are critical of such a claim. See G~inther Handl, Environmental Security and Global Change: The
Challenge to International Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 59-87,
78-79 (Winfried Lang et al. eds., 1994); BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 38, at 98. Dr. Hohmann's
thesis candidly relies on a notion of how customary international law grows that represents a departure
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Even an author on the other side of the argument has been properly cautious,
noting in 1995 that" [t]he legal status of the precautionary principle is evolving"
and "has now received sufficiently broad support to allow a good argument to
be made that it reflects a principle of customary law." 4' To say only that "a
cogent argument ' 49 or "a good argument" can be made is hardly a ringing
endorsement and a far cry from the kind of firm, definitive judgment that ought
to be demanded before members of the community of nations find their historic
autonomy constrained by a new legal norm without their consent.
Other experts have been highly critical. 50 A 1995 article by John M. Macdonald
of the University of Washington in Ocean Development and International Law
perceptively addresses these issues. His conclusion is:
the precautionary principle is problematic for a variety of reasons, most notably because
no consensus has developed to interpret its place in international policy making....
Although recognizing its role in policymaking, the international community is sharply
divided on how to apply the theory, and as a result, its status is subject to sharp debate
between decision makers, scientists, international conventions, and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs).
, .* Perhaps the greatest obstacle to establishing it as a guiding principle in interna-
tional law is a failure to understand its role in the shifting paradigms; ultimately the
principle may prove not to be an established norm of customary international law,
but may be the temporary answer to a policy/management void that these shifts have
created. 5'
* * * As the doctrine increasingly is being evaluated and asserted in international
dialogue, it may well be evolving into a consensualform of behavior constituting custom-
ary international law.
52
* * , The principle is not yet recognized as accepted customary law, primarily because
of the polarized arguments that have arisen in attempting to define the doctrine.
5 3
... [Tihe precautionary principle is referred to in a variety of international treaties
on the marine environment and within international environmental negotiations, but
most scholars agree that, as nonbinding documents, these instruments and policies do
not form any legal obligation-an obligation that must be required if the precautionary
from the conventional view. HOHMANN, supra note 15, at 170-71 & n.20a ("I will plead for a
modification of State practice, namely that diplomatic practice (internal practice) normally (or at
least for international environmental law) suffices" for the creation of customary international law).
48. Cameron & Abouchar, supra note 36 (quoting Philippe Sands, Principles of International
Environmental Law I: Frameworks, Standards and Implementation 213 (1995)), in Freestone & Hey,
supra note 17, at 37 & n.29; see also Sands, supra note 21.
49. See Fullem, supra note 31 (text accompanying note 25). Ultimately, Mr. Cameron and Ms.
Abouchar draw the same "good argument" conclusion. Cameron & Abouchar, supra note 36, at
52.
50. Professor Christopher D. Stone (of the University of Southern California School of Law),
for example, has acidly written: "That 'the precautionary principle' has become as fashionable as
it has is a sad testament to the level of the new legal scholarship. Stone, supra note 42, at
982.
51. John M. Macdonald, Appreciating the Precautionary Principle as an Ethical Evolution in
Ocean Management, 26 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 255, 155-56 (1995).
52. Id. at 262 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
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principle is to become "accepted" as law. Thus, its international status is still subject
to debate.
.. .Greenpeace is one international NGO that has embraced the precautionary princi-
ple in its strictest interpretation with respect to marine pollution (where any uncertainty
exists, do not allow the pollutant into the marine environment) and has raised the level
of public concern for continued pollution of the marine environment. Nonetheless,
theoretical implications of the principle are still debated passionately within international
and state negotiations. Thus, the concept has no clear definition as an "accepted"
principle of customary international law that the NGOs can agree on.55
• . . It is precisely because it may be considered to be more of a soft principle than
a code of conduct that its acceptance is so problematic as a form of customary interna-
tional law, because "soft" notions are vague and ambiguous. "An evolution of the
precautionary principle may fill the temporal gap in customary law. However, at this
point, [it is] too vague to allow a crystallization into customary law.,
56
The precautionary principle has proved to be one of the most problematic develop-
ments in the field of international environmental law. The literature devoted to defining
the principle is enormous and divisive. Scholars, policy makers, scientists, and NGOs
do agree on one point: Its future in international marine policy is highly controversial. 7
Mr. Macdonald's observations are fairminded and supported. Without dis-
cussing each of the intermediate judgments on which the "good argument" posi-
tion taken by others rests,58 the present writer concludes that elements of both
"political correctness" 59 and wishful thinking60 are here in the notion that the
precautionary principle-a relatively new entry on the horizon of international
relations-has, at this time, been elevated into a rule of international law. As
Professor Roht-Arriaza has noted, the generally accepted view is that "soft law"
"can be a precursor of the formation of either treaty or customary law, or can
confirm existing customary duties, but it cannot in itself establish new customary
law. -61
Casting his net broadly within the exploding body of literature, Professor Van
Dyke's paper posits a lengthy shopping list of specific obligations that he claims
54. Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 269 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 270 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 276.
58. For example, Mr. Cameron and Ms. Abouchar write that "[i]mplementation of the precau-
tionary principle through national legislation, and national judicial decisions is patchy, although the
intention to incorporate the precautionary principle is evident in policy papers and legislation."
Cameron & Abouchar, supra note 36, at 52 (emphasis added).
59. Or "fashionable." See Stone, supra note 42, at 982.
60. E.g., Roht-Arriaza, supra note 15, at 201 (until there is "international movement towards
pollution prevention and toxics use reduction[s], where financial incentives and technical assistance
from rich countries combine with the rediscovery and development of traditional low-input means
for producing goods it is optimistic to think of international environmental law as fully precautionary
in its approach"). A circular quality to the observation exists that "[n]onimplementation of this
general principle can be characterized as states resisting obligations (both binding and not) agreed
to at the international level, rather than grounds for finding that the obligation does not exist."
Cameron & Abouchar, supra note 36, at 52.
61. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 15, at 190 & nn.28-29 (footnotes omitted).
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arise from or reflect the overarching precautionary principle. These can be
addressed seriatim.
THE DUTY TO PREPARE AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT
In his latest paper, Professor Van Dyke states that "[t]his duty has been recog-
nized in numerous treaties, and a treaty has been drafted that spells out the
procedures to be used in drafting such an assessment in the international con-
text.', 62 He also cites a 1985 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) recommendation.63 As authority for his first point, he cites,
among other authorities, his own earlier article,64 which in turn cites U.S. National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (domestic United States legislation that
spawned an enormous body of litigation),65 several provisions of UNCLOS,66 and
the Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and the Environment of
the South Pacific Region. 67 Article 206 of UNCLOS provides:
When States have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities under their
jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution of or significant and harmful
changes to the marine environment, they shall, as far as practicable, assess the potential
effects of such activities on the marine environment and shall communicate reports of
the results of such assessments in the manner provided in article 205.68
The contents of this report are not further spelled out, and it certainly seems prema-
ture to rely on a mere draft treaty, as Professor Van Dyke seems to do, for this
purpose. His earlier article lists elements that he believes an environmental impact
statement (EIS) must contain, but his only authority for that list is an even earlier
essay of his own. 69 Interestingly, in his current essay, Professor Van Dyke com-
ments, among other things, that "[a]ctivities which are likely to pose a significant
risk to nature shall be preceded by an exhaustive examination ...- 70 If this state-
ment correctly frames the issue, then, if it can be concluded that significant risk is
not "likely" to be posed, no prior examination is required.
62. Van Dyke, supra note 2 (text accompanying notes 17-18) (footnotes omitted).
63. Id. (text accompanying notes 19) (footnotes omitted).
64. Jon M. Van Dyke, Sea Shipment of Japanese Plutonium Under International Law, 24 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 399, 402-03 & nn.38-40 (1993).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
66. Van Dyke, supra note 64, at 402-03.
67. Id. at 403 & n.40.
68. Oct. 7, 1982,21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982). Article 205 requires that article 206 reports be furnished
'at appropriate intervals to the competent international organizations, which should make them
available to all States." Id.
69. Van Dyke, supra note 64, at 403 & n.41 (citing Jon M. Van Dyke, Environmental Impact
Assessments, in CULTURAL VALUES IN THE AGE OF TECHNOLOGY 93-94 (Effie Cameron et al. eds.,
1991)).
70. Van Dyke, supra note 2 (note 15).
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THE DUTY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH
Professor Van Dyke asserts that "[e]veryone agrees that research efforts to
overcome uncertainties are essential,"'- citing only an OECD paper and Dr.
Hey's 1992 article in the Georgetown International Environmental Law Review.
These authorities simply do not create a duty under international law to conduct
research.
THE DUTY TO NOTIFY
This duty permits states to prepare contingency plans. Professor Van Dyke dis-
tinguishes it from the duty of prompt notification in case of an actual emergency.
He quotes another author for the proposition that the duty to notify "is almost a
fundamental principle of the international law of the environment." 72 The "OECD
documents" he cites prove to be mere recommendations.73 To the extent that his
paper addresses radioactive wastes (in addition to other radioactive materials), his
reliance74 on the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal75 is particularly surprising, since-as Pro-
fessors Kwiatkowska and Soons pointed out in offering "clarifications and addi-
tions' 76 to his 1993 article on Sea Shipment of Japanese Plutonium Under Interna-
tional Law 77-such wastes "are not covered" by the Basel Convention.78
THE DUTY TO CONSULT
Based on some of the authorities cited by Professor Van Dyke (especially those
in the earlier article to which he refers),79 one might think a plausible case can
be made for a duty to consult concerning plutonium shipments by sea. But this
proposition is far from clear. For example, a key quotation from the book he
relies on most heavily80 speaks of the "use of radioactive materials . .. in a way
that poses significant risk of appreciable harm to another country. . . . "" Query,
however, whether mere transportation constitutes "use" for this important pur-
pose. As for article 199 of UNCLOS, which he also invokes,82 that provision
71. Id. (text accompanying note 34).
72. Van Dyke, supra note 2 (text accompanying note 36) (quoting Laura Pineschi, The Transit
of Ships Carrying Hazardous Wastes Through Foreign Coastal Zones, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 314 (F. Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 1991)) (emphasis
added).
73. See HOHMANN, supra note 15, at 148-49.
74. Van Dyke, supra note 2 (text accompanying note 38).
75. Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 652 (1989).
76. Kwiatkowska & Soons, supra note 5, at 419.
77. Van Dyke, supra note 64, at 412 & n.178.
78. Kwiatkowska & Soons, supra note 5, at 419, 426 n.1.
79. Van Dyke, supra note 64, at 400-02.
80. Frederic Kirgis, Prior Consultation in International Law (1983).
81. Id.
82. Van Dyke, supra note 2, and text accompanying note 41.
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applies only to "the cases referred to in article 198," which in turn applies only
"[w]hen a State becomes aware of cases in which the marine environment is in
imminent danger of being damaged or has been damaged by pollution." 83 It is
difficult to view every shipment of plutonium or INF as presenting, a priori, an
"imminent danger" to the marine environment. Finally, assuming arguendo that
there would be a duty to consult does not necessarily mean that the intended
track must be disclosed, nor does it entirely resolve the question of which states
must be consulted.
THE DUTY TO DEVELOP ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUES
The notion that such a duty exists based solely on the international community's
past approach to a single activity-ocean incineration of wastes-is truly extrava-
gant. "It is like the thirteenth stroke of a crazy clock, which not only is itself
discredited but casts a shade of doubt over all previous assertions. "
'8
THE DUTY TO MITIGATE ALL REASONABLY FORESEEABLE DAMAGE
Professor Van Dyke cites, as authority for this "obligation," the precautionary
principle and "the core notions developed at Stockholm in 1972 and Rio de
Janeiro in 1992."8 5 The former does not support such a claim, and the latter do
not constitute binding rules of international law. Having thus posited a nonexistent
rule, Professor Van Dyke proceeds to attempt to reconcile that rule with estab-
lished rules regarding freedom of navigation, noting that "freedom of navigation
is not an absolute freedom and is subject to qualifications in all international
agreements." 86 In his view, "traditional navigational freedoms do not apply to
ultrahazardous cargoes" and "state practice requires notification and consultation
regarding shipments of ultrahazardous cargoes.",7 However, neither of these
assertions carries the day for his case.
The tension Professor Van Dyke seeks to create between recognized rights of
innocent passage and transit passage, on the one hand, and other duties under
UNCLOS, on the other, is a mirage. For example, he cites article 22(2) of
UNCLOS for the proposition that coastal states may regulate "ships carrying
nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances or materials,, 8' but
an inspection of that provision reveals that it applies only to the territorial sea
and simply permits coastal states to establish sea lanes. 89 He cites one author for
the proposition that article 198, which requires notification where "the marine
83. UNCLOS arts. 198, 199 (emphasis added).
84. A.P. HERBERT, UNCOMMON LAW, 28 (3d ed. 1937).
85. Van Dyke, supra note 2 (text following note 43).
86. Id.
87. Id. (text preceding notes 44 and 71)
88. UNCLOS art. 22(2).
89. UNCLOS art. 22(1).
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environment is in imminent danger of being damaged or has been damaged by
pollution," 90 "might be applicable even where a State becomes aware that a ship
flying its flag and carrying harmful wastes is not complying with the safety
regulations prescribed by Article 194.'' 9' But Ms. Pineschi cites no authority
for her view, which runs afoul of the obviously narrow language the drafters
carefully employed in article 198. The drafting of article 198 would plainly be
subverted if any violation of article 194 gave rise to coastal state power to interfere
with a transmitting vessel that carries hazardous materials.
Professor Van Dyke's reliance on the Basel Convention as "provid[ing] guid-
ance on this topic" 92 is baffling given the fact that, as he and others93 have noted,
the convention does not govern the movement of radioactive wastes if other
international agreements are in place with respect to those wastes. His discussion,
therefore, of the Japanese declaration (and those of other major maritime states)
concerning the Basel Convention not only seems irrelevant but also evinces a
lack of common ground as to the point he seeks to make by analogy. Even after
his earlier paper relying on the Basel Convention evoked a spirited and detailed
response by Professors Kwiatkowska and Soons, Professor Van Dyke labors to
avoid the textual problem as to "the Pacific Pintail's shipment of vitrified glass
blocks of high level wastes." 94
Article 17 of UNCLOS provides that "[s]ubject to this Convention, ships of
all States, whether coastal or land-locked enjoy the right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea." 95 Professor Van Dyke suggests that article 19, which
excludes from the definition of innocent passage96 "(h) any act of wilful and
serious pollution contrary to" 97 UNCLOS, is pertinent because "it is obvious that
many coastal nations view the consequences of an accident involving a shipment of
radioactive materials to be so catastrophic that such shipments constitute wilful
acts of serious pollution even though the likelihood of an accident that would
actually cause such pollution may be small." 98 This is not a plausible argument
90. UNCLOS art. 198.
91. Pineschi, supra note 72, at 306.
92. Id.
93. Kwiatowska & Soons, supra note 5, at 419, 426 n. 1; Raul A. Pedrozo, Transport of Nuclear
Cargoes by Sea, 28 J. MAR. L. & Com. 207, 222 n.68 (1997).
94. Id.
95. UNCLOS art. 17.
96. His paper inadvertently refers to the "lm]eaning of innocent practice" (emphasis added).
97. UNCLOS art. 19(n)
98. Van Dyke, supra note 2 (text accompanying note 66). In this regard he cites Ms. Pineschi,
who in turn cites article 23 of UNCLOS, under which "ships carrying nuclear substances shall,
when exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, carry documents and observe
special precautionary measures established for such ships by international agreements." UNCLOS
art. 23. In other words, the drafters of UNCLOS negotiated a provision that permits innocent passage
by such vessels to be trenched upon only as provided by international agreements. See Rothwell,
supra note 27, at 614. It thus in no way supports self-help or unilateral measures by coastal states
through whose territorial waters such vessels may sail.
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simply as a textual matter; if words have meaning, one cannot treat as a wilfl
act of actual pollution the passive permitting of operating conditions that an
interested observer might view as giving rise to a risk of pollution. As Professor
Rothwell has stated, UNCLOS
does not allow for a proactive suspension of passage because of the risk of pollution.
Indeed, article 23 clearly anticipates that vessels carrying noxious substances can engage
in innocent passage.
Although there can be no denying that a maritime accident involving a cargo of pluto-
nium poses a substantial environmental risk to a coastal state, unilateral responses by states
to this problem will only create conflict in an uncertain area of the law. .... 99
Contrary to Professor Van Dyke's contention, no requirement exists for prior
notification and consultation (much less prior informed consent (PIC)) as a matter
of customary international law in the case of plutonium or radioactive waste
shipments by sea. The state practice he cites"°° shows a marked divergence of
state positions on the matter. Moreover, he produces, at best, ambiguous evidence
for Japanese acquiescence in the protests its shipments have encountered. For
example, he notes that the vessel carrying the 1992 plutonium shipment appeared
to have avoided some EEZs but not others.' 0' Acquiescence in the Chilean show
of force in the context of the Pacific Pintail voyage in 1995 is equally unavailing,
not only because of the imbalance of forces, but also because of the presence
of other factors, such as adverse weather and sea conditions, that counseled in
favor of a course adjustment."
Setting aside this mixed record of state practice, Professor Van Dyke's principle
is far from uniformly established in diplomatic practice. For example, as Profes-
sors Kwiatkowska and Soons have noted, "the most pronounced difference [be-
tween the London Dumping Convention (LDC) and the Basel Convention] con-
sists in the absence from the LDC of requirements of prior notification/PIC which
are envisaged in the Resolution LDC.29(10) without specifying their detailed
conditions and defining the role of [the] transit state.' ' 0 3 They also comment:
Whereas there appears to be no need of including notification/PIC procedures into
the LDC which has objectives different from (though complementary to) the export/
import-oriented Basel Convention, the objections raised against such inclusion during
the LDC meetings could partly relate to the politically sensitive question of the enforce-
ability of these procedures by a transit state. In particular, under the Basel Convention/
IAEA Code system (and likewise the [Organization of African Unity] (OAU) Bamako
Convention) there arises a major difficulty in accommodating the rules of prior notifica-
tion and consent of the transit state for waste shipments on the one hand, and the regimes
of maritime spaces (territorial sea and 200 mile zone) within its jurisdiction where
navigation is not subject to either prior notification or permission of that state on the
99. Rothwell, supra note 27, at 616 & nn. 198-200 (footnotes omitted).
100. Van Dyke, supra note 2 (text accompanying notes 71-107).
101. Van Dyke, supra note 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
102. Van Dyke, supra note 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
103. KWIATKOWSKA & SOONS, supra note 3, at xliii.
FALL 1997
772 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
other hand. In fact, such accommodation, which belonged to the hard-core issues
throughout the preparations of the Basel Convention, appears impossible without affect-
ing either of the rights involved. This can be exemplified by the position of the United
States aiming to restrict the applicability of PIC under the Basel Convention to land
territory and internal waters of the transit state. While preserving navigational rights,
this can diminish the effectiveness of the PIC. A position favouring navigational free-
doms can also be anticipated from the [European Community] EC members and other
maritime powers. It seems, therefore, most likely that such maritime states prefer to
prevent extension of this controversial problem into the LDC framework.I°4
In light of this discussion, and since existing treaties are, to say the least,
inconsistent with respect to prior notification/PIC, it would be difficult to show
there was, absent some applicable treaty, such an obligation under customary
international law.
III. Conclusion
Based on this review of the pertinent authorities and literature, although many
thorny navigational rights issues must still be resolved under UNCLOS,'0 5 the
position espoused by Professor Van Dyke with respect to the transportation of
plutonium and SNF by sea must be understood more as advocacy than as a
disinterested appraisal of the current state of international law. As IMO and
other interested international organizations and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) address the interplay of the law of the sea, environmental law and the
pertinent public policy questions, they must not be under the misimpression that
traditional concepts of maritime transportation and the law of the sea have been
either supplanted or diluted in the fashion he suggests. It must be emphasized
that it is by no means clear that a precautionary principle (much less any particular
formulation or application of such a principle) has the force of customary interna-
tional law at this time. Whether such a principle ought to or will in time be
reflected in some binding international agreement applicable to the transportation
of plutonium and SNF depends on what makes sense from a public policy stand-
point, with due regard to the navigational rights that have heretofore been so
very firmly embedded in the body of international law.
The law of the sea is inherently a conservative body of doctrine, and the major
maritime powers are, barring unforeseen circumstances, likely to continue to be
highly wary of embracing principles the parameters of which are fuzzy and which,
as a practical matter, may infringe on their navigational, economic and political
interests. One can confidently predict that these states will be vigilant (now that
issue has been joined over the application vel non of the precautionary principle
to maritime transport of plutonium and SNF) in asserting their own views and,
where appropriate, resisting the accretion of further incidental support for that
principle in this context.
104. Id. at xlvi-xlvii.
105. See generally Rothwell, supra note 27, at 628-31.
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